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Abstract: In our information-age, the necessary scientic exploration is mainly driven
by mining new insights from many diverse data sets. While there is a consensus that
a collaborative data infrastructure is needed to allow researchers in dierent domains
to collaborate on the same data sets in order to get new insights, there are signicant
barriers to the realization of this vision. One of the key challenge is to allow scientists
to share their data widely while retaining some form of control over who accesses this
data (access control) and more importantly how it is used (usage control). Access and
usage control is necessary to enforce existing open data policies. We have proposed the
vision of trusted cells: A decentralized infrastructure, based on secure hardware running
on devices equipped with trusted execution environments at the edges of the Internet.
We originally described the utilization of trusted cells for the management of personal
data. We describe our vision and report on our progress towards the implementation of
trusted cells on off-the-shelf hardware components. We show how trusted cells deployed
in the field and throughout the community could make it possible to share ecological data
sets with access and usage control guarantees. We rely on examples from terrestrial
research and monitoring in the arctic in the context of the INTERACT project.
Keywords: arctic terrestrial research and monitoring, ecological data sets, trusted cells,
data platform.
1 INTRODUCTION
The grand challenges facing our societies – climate change and energy supply – require
significant scientific breakthroughs. In our information-age, the necessary scientitic ex-
ploration is mainly driven by mining new insights from vast, diverse data sets. The need
to organize the management, publication and archival of these scientific data set, initially
pointed out by Jim Gray Hey et al. [2009], is now widely recognized both in the Euro-
pean Union Wood [2010] and in the United States (most recently with the US President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology pointing out the need for increased public
access to federal biodiversity data Holder and Lander [2011])1.
A collaborative data infrastructure is needed to allow researchers in different domains to
collaborate on the same data sets in order to find new insights. While there is a consen-
sus on the need for such an infrastructure, there are significant barriers to its realization.
The final report of the High level Expert Group on Scientic Data submitted to the Euro-
pean Commission in October 2010 Wood [2010] summarizes the requirement for such an
1Note that while the problem of access and usage control is not directly mentionned in the PCAST report on
ecosystem data, the committee has acknowledged the need for strong attribution of the data according to Alon
Halevy from Google.
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infrastructure as follows: The emerging infrastructure for scientific data must be flexible
but reliable, secure yet open, local and global, affordable yet high-performance. There
are thus many tensions to be resolved. In particular, the report mentions the problem
of access and usage control: the data must be available to whomever, whenever and
wherever needed, yet still be protected if necessary by a range of constraints includ-
ing by-attribution licenses, commercial license, time embargos, or institutional affiliation.
How do scientists share their data widely but also retain control over who uses them and
how? This is the core problem we focus on.
In this paper, we restrict our attention on ecological data about arctic terrestrial ecosys-
tems. While observation and monitoring data is expensive to obtain in the arctic because
of the remote nature of the environment, the problem of access and usage control has
never been particularly acute in this community. Indeed, research groups have had a form
of monopoly about a given area. As a result, a data set about CO2 flux exchange orig-
inating from the Abisko station in Sweden, or from the Zackenberg station in Greenland
could only have been obtained by a handful researchers. These researchers are adminis-
trating the data they collect and grant access to the data sets upon request. For example,
the regulations for using Abisko Scientific Research Station (Abisko Naturvetenskapliga
Station, ANS) climate data is a good representative of the state of the art in terms of data
access in the arctic research community: When you wish to use climate data collected
under the responsibility of ANS please note that a formal request for data is needed. The
request should be supplied by a brief outline of the intended use of the data. The data
should not be passed to a third person 2.
This situation is changing dramatically. First, the situation of monopoly in terms of data
collection no longer exists. The INTERACT infrastructure project 3, funded by EU FP7,
is pushing this paradigm shift. The Interact project regroups 33 arctic field sites. Its main
goal is to promote transnational access to these sites, thus allowing scientists and policy
makers to identify, understand, predict and respond to diverse environmental changes
throughout the wide environmental and land-use envelopes of the Arctic. As a result,
station managers are coordinating monitoring activities across sites and researchers are
encouraged to conduct observations at several sites. The issue of attribution is thus no
longer trivial. Second, offline access and usage control no longer fits the needs of the
community in terms of data sharing. There is a growing pressure for scientists to share
their data and make them available online. This was formalized in reports from the OECD
on Principles and Guidelines for Access to Research Data from Public Funding in 2004
and 2007. These reports recommended to formulate explicit, formal institutional prac-
tices, such as the development of rules and regulations, regarding the responsibilities
of the various parties involved in data-related activities. These practices should pertain
to authorship, producer credits, ownership, dissemination, usage restrictions, financial
arrangements, ethical rules, licensing terms, liability, and sustainable archiving. An in-
stance of this open data policy is the Data Policy adopted for the International Polar
Year (IPY) in 2006. It recommended that Data should be accessible soon after collec-
tion, online wherever possible. This is however not a reality yet. In their State of Polar
Data Parsons et al. [2009], an assessment of the IPY data legacy, Parsons et al. remark
that overall, data sharing is commonly recognized as a scientific imperative, but the tech-
nical mechanisms require further development and cultural norms of science still resist
sharing. They add that Data citation is increasingly recognized as a valid process, but
implementation is sporadic at best. Finally, Parsons et al. recognize the need for strong
access and usage control mechanisms: data should be as unrestricted as possible, but
scientists need to establish norms of behavior that ensure proper, informed, and equi-
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So, how to enforce access and usage control of data in the scientific community? An
approach is to rely on guidelines and policies manually enforced by data managers. This
approach was successful in the context of the US Long Term Ecological Research (LTER)
Network Porter [2009]. The premise is that data managers are funded to enforce policies.
This has not been the case in the polar community. This largely explains the lack of
success of data sharing during the International Polar year, and the failure of the Polar
Information Commons , supported by CODATA, and launched in 2009. Besides, it is
virtually impossible for a data manager to verify that data is not transmitted to a third party,
or that data is appropriately attributed in the litterature. Is it so possible to completely
enforce access and usage control of scientific data, without the manual intervention of a
data manager?
The hypothesis that underlies our work is that Privacy Enhancing Technologies can be
used to automatically enforce usage and access control in the arctic ecologists commu-
nity. Note that such mechanisms do not preclude the need for data managers; on the
contrary, data managers could leverage these mechanisms and shift their focus from ac-
cess and usage control to other stewardship tasks such as quality control or long-term
archival. In this paper, we present our vision of data sharing based on a decentraliwed
data platform that provides strong usage control guarantees and we report on the current
status of our prototyping efforts.
2 VISION
Let us take a simplified example of how ecological data sets are collected and shared in
the INTERACT community. Figure 1 shows activities taking place in a scenario involving
two field sites (Zackenberg and Abisko), four labs (DMU, U.Lund, U.Oulu, and U.Alaska)
and the online Knowledge Network for Biodiversity (KNB) repository for ecological data
sets recommended by Nature. Data acquisition takes place at the field sites. Data acqui-
sition is either manual or automatic; most of the collected data is digital on data loggers
or PDAs, some of the data collected manually is in analog form (and is later digitized
in a lab). On Figure 1, A and E are technicians collecting data in the context of moni-
toring programs at Zackenberg and Abisko, while B is a researcher from U.Oulu who is
collecting observations during an expedition at Zackenberg.
Today, data is transfered from the field sites to a lab either via physical transfer of the
storage media (sneakernet). A goal of the INTERACT project is to make the streams of
data collected by data loggers available on the Internet. Note that data loggers cannot
be directly connected to the Internet because of obvious connectivity limitations. Data is
gathered via a low power local area network (LLN) onto a hub that is connected to a lab
gateway via satellite connection (Iridium). The data collected from the data loggers are
stored onto a database on the gateway, then made available online as a stream (views
might be defined for the purpose of access control).
Let us now illustrate how data is processed and shared in the context of a monitoring
program. M is manager of the monitoring program at DMU (NERI). He receives the data
collected by A in the field. Her responsability is then to go through a data cleaning phase,
and possibly a data derivation phase. This phases might be conducted together with
colleagues from other institutions (U.Lund) in our example) participating in the program,
under the responsability of the program manager. Today, data sets are exchanged by
mail or made available on ftp sites, i.e., a weak form of access control is enforced and
there is no usage control. Double checks are necessary to make sure that an anomly
detection or a data derivation are conducted properly. This is very time consuming.
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Figure 1. Sanitized case study illustrating data sharing in the INTERACT community
When the program manager is satisfied with the quality of a data set, she can publish
it. To do so, she sends the data set to a local data manager who loads the data into a
database equipped with a web query front-end. Once, data is made publically available
on the DMU web site, the program manager has no longer control over who accesses
it or how it is used. For example, if a new annotation is attached to a data set, there is
no way to communicate it to the researchers who previously downloaded the data set.
There is also no way to check that the researchers that use the data actually follow the
usage policy defined by the data manager.
Let us now turn our attention to how data is processed and shared in the context of a
research project. B collected data in the field. Back in the lab, at U.Oulu, he combines the
data he has patiently gathered over the last 10 years with data sets he downloaded from
the DMU web site. He builds a new predictive model and publishes his findings in Nature.
As part of the Nature publication policy, he makes his data available online on the KBN
web site. Ideally, reviewers and other researchers should be able to check that his model
actually fits the data he gathered, they should be able to check that there is no obvious
anomaly in the collected data, but they should not be able to derive a new model without
explicitely crediting B for his work. Note that the access control mechanism provided by
the KBN web site allows B to control who is accessing his data, but not how this data is
then used (and possibly transmitted to a third party). For example, R from U.Alaska has
contacted B to get access to his data set. Once access is granted, R cannot track how
the data is used and how it is combined with the data stream obtained from Abisko. More
interestingly, R might not credit DMU for collecting the data sets that were instrumental
for building B’s model. This is an illustration of the issue identified by the OECD report on
open data policies: Whenever possible, access to data sets should be linked with access
to the original research materials, and copied data sets should be linked with originals,
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as this facilitates validation of the data and identification of errors within data sets.
Note that researchers might in fact be more interested in a form of auditing of how their
data is used rather than in enforcing strict usage control policies, governmental orga-
nizations might share this goal, while private organizations might want to enforce more
precise usage control policies. Our approach consists in providing a uniform solution to
those different requirements. But, what is usage control? Usage control models usually
refer to UCONABC Park and Sandhu [2004]. In the UCONABC model, subjects provide or
consume data objects. A subject accesses objects via a set of usage functions referred
to as rights. A reference monitor is responsible for taking usage decisions based on the
subject and object attributes as well as Authorization, oBligations and Conditions (ABC).
Authorizations are predicates that define whether a subject is authorized to hold a right;
obligations are predicates that define the actions that a subject must take before or while
it holds a rights; and conditions define predicates that must hold true about the environ-
ment in which the subject requires a given right. In our experience, current open data
policies defined for ecological data sets can easily be expressed in terms of (i) rights,
and (ii) authorizations, obligations and condition rules.
What does it take to enforce a UCONABC model? The data platform should implement
a reference monitor and guarantee that there will be no access to data objects unless
appropriate usage decisions (i.e., decisions that respect the contract negociated by all
parties) are taken. The basic idea is that the reference monitor is a software component
that relies on hardware security features separating a secure world (where objects, at-
tributes, as well as rights, authorizations and conditions are securely stored, while usage
decisions are securely executed) and a non secure world (where the rest of the process-
ing takes place). There is today, to the best of our knowledge, no implementation of any
UCONABC model.
How to enforce access control and usage control in this scenario? A solution is to con-
sider that all actors rely on Google’s FusionTable (or a similar centralized architecture)
to store and share their data. The features of FusionTable might not exactly match the
needs of all actors, but they come pretty close. A problem could be the lack of con-
nectivity on the field sites, but this might not be a major barrier to adoption. A more
serious problem would be the monopoly position gained by Google if all researchers and
institutions started to publish their data on FusionTables. The solution we investigate is
a different point in the design space. We define a distributed infrastructure for sharing
ecological data sets with access and usage control guarantees. In this distributed archi-
tecture, researchers and data managers are equipped with trusted cells. We describe
the architecture of trusted cells in the next Section.
3 TRUSTED CELLS
The decentralized architecture we propose for the sharing of ecological data sets with
access and usage control guarantees is based on Trusted Cells interconnected via an
Untrusted Infrastructure Anciaux et al. [2013].
Trusted Cells: A trusted cell implements a client-side reference monitor Park and Sandhu
[2004] on top of secure hardware. At a minimum, the hardware must guarantee a clear
separation between secure and non-secure software. We abstract a Trusted Cell as (1) a
Trusted Execution Environment, (2) a tamper-resistant memory where cryptographic se-
crets are stored, (3) an optional and potentially untrusted mass storage and (4) commu-
nication facilities. Physically, a trusted cell can either be a stand-alone hardware device
(e.g., a smart token) or be embedded in an existing device (e.g., a smartphone based on
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ARMs TrustZone architecture).
The very high security provided by trusted cells comes from a combination of factors: (1)
the obligation to physically be in contact with the device to attack it, (2) the tamper-
resistance of (part of) its processing and storage units making hardware and side-
channel attacks highly difficult, (3) the certification of the hardware and software platform,
or the openness of the code, making software attacks (e.g., Trojan) also highly difficult,
(4) the capacity to be auto-administered, contrary to high-end multi-user servers, avoid-
ing insider (i.e., DBA) attacks, and (5) the impossibility even for the trusted cell owner to
directly access the data stored locally or spy the local computing (she must authenticate
and only gets data according to her privileges). In terms of functionality, a full-fledged
trusted cell should be able to (1) acquire data and synchronize it with the users digital
space, (2) extract metadata, index it and provide query facilities on it, (3) cryptograph-
ically protect data against confidentiality and integrity attacks, (4) enforce access and
usage control rules, (5) make all access and usage actions accountable, (6) participate
to computations distributed among trusted cells. Basic (e.g., sensor-based) trusted cells
may implement a subset of this.
Untrusted infrastructure: The infrastructure provides the storage, computing and com-
munication services, which expand the resources of a single trusted cell and form the
glue between trusted cells. By definition, the infrastructure does not benefit from the
hardware security of the trusted cell and is therefore considered untrusted. We consider
that a Cloud-based service provider implements the untrusted infrastructure .
In terms of functionality, the untrusted infrastructure is assumed to: (1) ensure a highly
available and resilient store for all data outsourced by trusted cells, (2) provide commu-
nication facilities among cells and (3) participate to distributed computations (e.g., store
intermediate results), provided this participation can be guaranteed harmless by security
checks implemented at the trusted cells side.
4 PROTOTYPE
Our first prototype, developed in the context of the INTERACT project, focuses on the
storage and retrieval of time series in a trusted execution environment. This is the foun-
dation of a trusted cell. The design of access and usage control policies adapted for the
INTERACT community, and the design/implementation of mechanisms to enforce these
properties is a topic for on-going work.
According to the GlobalPlatform consortium 4, a trusted execution environment (TEE) is
a secure area of a computing device that ensures that sensitive data is only stored, pro-
cessed and protected by authorized software. The secure area is separated by hardware
from the device’s main operating system and applications. Put differently, computing de-
vices fall in two categories: (i) general purpose devices that do not provide any guarantee
for authorized software, and (ii) secure devices, where authorized software can execute
in a secure area which is not accessible by the rest of the system. Secure devices sepa-
rate a secure area from a non-secure area, which we denote rich area in the rest of this
document, following the terminology from the GlobalPlatform consortium, while general
purpose computing devices merely provide a rich area.
A potential large number of applications are expected to be installed and run concur-
rently in the rich area, therefore sharing software and hardware resources (e.g., libraries,
drivers, peripherals, memory, etc.). As in any modern rich execution environment, access
4http://www.globalplatform.org
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control is in effect to protect shared resources, with a user space distinct from a kernel
space. Software running in kernel space has access to all resources (e.g., data and
programs in memory or on secondary storage). The rich area is in constant exposure
to the outer world, thus attacks are to be expected. The assumption should be that with
enough time and expertise an attacker can obtain root access to kernel space. As a con-
sequence, all programs and data stored in or handled in the rich area are at risk of being
exposed, including sensitive data and encryption keys. As we stated above, a secure
device provides a hardware separation between the secure area and the rich area. Note
that this is a slight generalization of GlobalPlatform’s definition, which mentions that rich
and secure areas should run on a same processor. We extend this definition so that a
secure co-processor, or a smart card are considered trusted execution environments. In
fact, we consider that any device equipped with a processor for the rich area, and another
one for the secure area is a secure device as long as there is a guarantee that only autho-
rized software runs in the secure area. We even consider that a virtual machine (VM) is a
trusted execution environment as long as the hypervisor relies on hardware primitives to
isolate each VM. Defining an ontology of these secure devices and precisely qualifying
how secure they are is beyond the scope of this demonstration. It is a topic for future
work.
Whenever rich and secure areas share physical memory, it is mandatory that software
running in the rich area by no means is able to access memory allocated to the secure
area. If peripherals are shared Secure must have prioritized access to them in such a
way that if the rich area is compromised, the peripheral can still be accessed from the
secure area even when a DoS attack is launched against it. More generally, the only
assumption made in the secure area is that the authorized code that is run there can be
trusted to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the data. This is a big assumption,
but model-based development and formal methods can provide interesting guarantees.
Again, exploring how model-based development can be leveraged in the context of se-
cure data management is a fascinating topic for future work. Our prototype relies on
ARM TrustZone. In [2] we presented a framework that combines commercially available
hardware and open source software and enables the development of applications for
TrustZone’s secure area. In this framework, rich and secure areas are running on a sin-
gle processor. TrustZone provides a hardware mechanism to separate the secure and
rich areas. This mechanism relies on the so-called NS bit, an extension of the AMBA3
AXI Advanced Peripheral Bus (APS), a peripheral bus that is attached to the system bus
using an AXI-to-APB-bridge. The NS bit distinguishes those instructions stemming from
the secure area and those stemming from the rich area. Access to the NS bit is protected
by a gatekeeper mechanism in the Operating System. The Operating system thus distin-
guishes between user space, kernel space and secure space. Only authorized software
is running in secure space, without interference from user or kernel space. TrustZone
defines a communication abstraction for the interaction between programs running in the
rich area that act as clients, and programs running in the secure area that act as servers.
This client-server communication is session-based (each session is bound to programs
in the rich area); no state is kept in the secure area across sessions (any state must be
explicitly stored in memory or on secondary storage).
TruztZone is implemented in ARM popular processors: Cortex-A9 and Cortex-A15 (e.g.,
powering platforms such as Samsung Exynos and Nvidia Tegra series) that can readily
be used in laptops, smartphones, PDAs and tablets that researchers use or delpoyed
in the field to extend data loggers. The description of the platform (hardware, software
combination) that we are using for our prototype can be found in Gonza´lez and Bonnet
[2013].
In our prototype, running on Trustzone, the rich area provides the data platform that rely
on trusted storage primitives. Authorized storage components running in the secure area
Ph.Bonnet et al. / A Distributed Architecture for Sharing Ecological Data Sets with Access and Usage Control Guarantees
can encrypt data and store keys in a tamper-resistant chip thus guaranteeing data con-
fidentiality; They can verify that the encrypted data that has been stored corresponds
to the data that was written, thus guaranteeing data integrity; They can replicate data
stored locally on several remote instances (e.g., on the cloud), thus providing availability
and durability. Note that availability and durability come at the cost of performance. Ex-
ploring this trade-off is a topic for future work. Our prototype achieves data integrity and
confidentiality on top of TrustZone.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reported on our vision of a decentralized data platform for sharing eco-
logical data sets. Much work remains to be done in order to implement this vision and to
actually experiment with sharing ecological data sets. Such experiments will be crucial
to validate our approach and adapt the technology to the sharing needs of various com-
munities. The motivation and the examples in this paper are grounded in the terrestrial
arctic research and monitoring community, because this work took place in the context
of the INTERACT project, but we believe that other communities could benefit from our
approach.
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